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Champion: Heidi And Seek

Heidi and Seek:
Cases of Espionage and Covert
Operation in Switzerland,

1795-1995
by Brian Champion

When, exactly, Switzerland became a hub for intelligence gathering
and covert operations has been lost to the mists of time . Despite centuries of implicit and declared transnational neutrality, Switzerland, by the
cruel ironies of geographic fate, couldn't help being at the confluence of
the intelligence realpolitik in Europe and, later, in the world. This article
seeks to illustrate through selected examples--from the early nineteenth
to the twentieth centuries--facets of the history of the foreign use of
Switzerland and the Swiss neutrality ideal in the tectonic power politics of international intrigue. Spying and associated covert operations
in Switzerland-then as now-are illegal, of course, as they are in all
countries. But the Swiss history of clandestine or subrepitious actions
is rich and seldom acknowledged, and this article intends to illumine
selected clandestine cases which illustrate how Switzerland accommodates covert enterprise.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example,
the British ambassador to Bern, William Wickham, used diplomatic
cover to create and manage Secret Service operations intended to support French aristocrats under threat of assassination or summary execution. Wickham was sent to Switzerland to investigate the credibility
of French royalists' claims of strengths and support during the French
Revolution; French royalty financed the operation, dubbed Agence
Fran9aise, but it was intellectually controlled and managed by the British Secret Service. Wickham 's Swiss contact was an expatriate French
general, Charles Gregan Craufurd, who, from his villa in Vienna, had
been recruiting foreign mercenaries to fight on the royalists ' behalf. Both
29
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Wickham and Craufurd recruited Swiss and foreign military talent, and
in so doing, created a large number of British intelligence agents who
reported through ersatz military channels on the socio-military developments, and which were of considerable interest to the British Foreign
Office in London. These developments created, in the words of British
historian Elizabeth Sparrow, "a unified Franco/British continental system of espionage" which had its headquarters in Vaud canton. 1
Through the winter of 1795-96, Wickham relocated to Lausanne
where he directed Francis Drake, the Crown's representative in Milan
and Genoa, to create "agencies" similar to those he had created in Switzerland. Drake did, but Napoleon's successful Italian campaign forced
Drake to flee to Venice and his agents were left to their own devices;
some fled to the south of France while others made their way to Vaud
and were incorporated into Wickham's Swiss agency. Through these
agents, Wickham controlled royalist cells in southern France and even
some located in the French interior. 2
The French royalist strategy of peaceful electoral reform of the
anti-monarchists devolved into legislative gridlock, and only military
action was considered the sole remedy to political inertia; in short,
Wickham's agents and their associates in Paris were soon ratted out ,
induced by lures of cash for information, and the British intelligence effort in Switzerland was quickly penetrated, also compromised by some
of the mercenaries recruited to do its bidding. As Sparrow notes, "The
immediate consequences were to force the breaking of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Switzerland; the rupture of peace negotiations at Lille; the end of the Swiss Agency [the Foreign Office's
spy organization], and most important for this discussion, the end of
attempts to promote counter-revolution by the electoral process." 3
In the geopolitics of European revolution and counterrevolution ,
this (temporary) failure of the British covert efforts, when discovered,
accelerated French efforts to substantiate monarchy throughout the
continent; even while temporary setbacks were encountered, they none-

1
Elizabeth Sparrow, "The Swiss and Swabian Agencies, 1795-1801," The Historical Journal 35(4): pp. 861-84. See also Elizabeth Sparrow, Secret Service : British
Agents in France, 1792-1815 (Suffolk: The Boydell Press , 1999).
2
Ibid, p. 865.
3
Ibid, p. 868.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/4

2

Champion: Heidi And Seek
Heidi and Seek

31

theless rebounded generally (and in Switzerland particularly) until the
counterrevolutionary movement had faded . But as Sparrow also notes ,
the British role in using various forms of cover in Swiss territory merely
illustrates cases in the modern use of Switzerland as the confluence of
information and influence. Indeed, Sparrow correctly asserts that it is
important to know "[t]he political significance of Anglo-French 'agencies', which were paid-and controlled-by the British government between 1795 and 1801 ... The principal purpose of formal [espionage]
agencies [in Switzerland] was to sanction British counterrevolutionary
activities within France, which would have been seen by the French as
blatant interference in the internal affairs of their nation. The agencies
also provided an umbrella for British attempts to coordinate all the antirevolutionary groups [on the continent], whether true royalists or not.
.. . They also permitted many agents to be left unaware of, or even to
repudiate, British control, while still accepting British money." 4
The British weren't the only ones who sought for and established
complicity for covert programs among native Swiss. In the late eighteenth century, pre-revolutionary pro-tsarist Russian agents throughout
Europe sought information on, and sometimes lethally dispatched, antitsarist elements under the sway of continental anti-tsarist republican
political sentiments. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Russian
government department which monitored political crimes internally
was called the Okhrannye Otdeellenii (commonly abbreviated to just
Okhrannye) but to have a respectable foreign presence, the Okhrannye
created the Foreign Agency, based in Russia's Paris embassy, and while
content to surveil dissident Russians, it also had to battle the Department of Police agents also sent abroad for dominance in the business of
feeding the government intelligence. In 1907, for example, Okhrannye
intercepted a communication intended for the Department of Police in
St Petersburg which confirmed Swiss complicity in the covert spying of
Russian exiles in Switzerland: "From the letter of our envoy to the Swiss
Republic, I see, among other things, that a code for secret messages has
been established between the Department of Police and Hodier [head of
the Swiss Federal Police] ... " 5

4

Ibid , pp . 861-62.
Richard J Johnson, "Zagranichnaia Agentura: The Tsarist Political Police in
Europe ," Journal of Contemporary History 7(1/2 (1972) : pp. 222 , 224 .
5
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The role and utility of the so-called "externals" can be simply explained: "Unlike internals, all of whom were Russian, no detectives in
the external agency were Russian. They were all native to the country
in which they habitually worked-an obvious requirement to avoid attracting suspicion and to facilitate contacts with non-Russians for the
purpose of acquiring information." 6
As historian Richard J Johnson reports, the failure of some Swiss
agents to blend into the innocuous background of cantons and Swiss
cities limited their utility in covert operations. "Interestingly, one [external] agent (the Swiss detective Rigault) was dismissed because his
obesity attracted too much public attention." 7 However, so great was the
interest in the activities and disposition of Russian exiles that Okhrana
operatives concentrated their attentions on the expatriate communities in
Paris, London and Berlin; other colonies of Russian ex pats were monitored by local police, and in Geneva, the Okhrana had very specialized
assistance: "In Switzerland, an important center of emigre activity, the
internal agency [Okhrana] was depended on heavily for information . In
this task it had the support of three Russophile Geneva policemen [later
identified by their last names: Depasse!, Deleamon, and Bocque] who
were on the Agency [Okhrana] payroll to pass on whatever information came to them at the Geneva police office, and secondly to provide
a check on information sent directly from Geneva police officials to
the head of the Foreign Agency." 8 In addition to the three cops, it was
also noted that at least one Swiss postal worker, a man named Mercier,
provided mail to and from interesting Swiss correspondents which the
Okhrana then read. 9
The effect of all this covert observation was that at some point the
pro-tsarists spies sent their information to Russian ambassadors, who
then conveyed to their host governments a very likely exaggerated view
of the threat these emigres posed to the stability of the host countries.
As a result, the local police would periodically arrest individuals identified solely by Okhrana as a 'threat' and they would be incarcerated; one
such dragnet caught a young Russian student who lamented in a let6

Johnson, p. 227.
Okhrannye Archive, quoted in Johnson , p. 228 .
8
Johnson,pp .222,224.
9
Johnson, p. 229 . Johnson's use of the plural "employees" suggests more than
one postal worker was receiving Okhrana remuneration, seep. 233 .
7

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/4

4

Champion: Heidi And Seek
Heidi and Seek

33

ter to friends that Switzerland had become enormously less friendly to
revolutionaries and that he would rather live in Belgium where he could
peaceably pursue his studies. 10
In another example of the usefulness of Swiss neutrality to covert
operations, the start of World War I put Italy with the alliance but they
ultimately switched sides. This caused some difficulties for the Italians
and for the Vatican secret service which looked for a more accommodating locale from which to collect information. "When Italy entered the
war [in 1915], Berlin and Vienna closed their embassies in the Eternal
City and recalled their diplomats . The German and Austrian embassies
to the Holy See relocated to Lugano, Switzerland, where they tried to
maintain long-distance relations with the Vatican. Franz von Stockhammern [a German diplomat at the Rome embassyl 1] also moved his espionage operations to Switzerland, where, from the security of neutral
territory, he organized intelligence networks inside Italy." 12
Not only was Swiss territory used by the war's belligerents for
espionage, it was also useful for other purposes: "Switzerland was a fertile field for Italian intelligence operations against the Papacy in large
part because Italian military intelligence had convinced itself that the
Alpine confederation was the center of a clandestine committee that
secretly controlled the pope and determined the policies of the Vatican.
The Italians believed that this shadowy group was directed by a triumvirate made of the papal delegate to Switzerland, the Father General of
the Jesuits, who had relocated the headquarters of the famous religious
order to Switzerland for the duration of the war, and (most improbably)
the bishop of Coire, a small diocese in the Romansche region of Switzerland . Through the war, SIM [Italian intelligence] received reports
that the Papacy's major diplomatic initiatives, particularly plans in 1917
to mediate a negotiated settlement of the war, were contrived or at least
approved by this secret directorate, which, in turn, had clandestine connections to Berlin and Vienna." 13
While such an idea might have been popular with anti-Catholics,
as Vatican historian David Alvarez remarks, "The idea was, of course,
10

Johnson, p. 241 .
David Alvarez, Spies in the Vatican: Espionage and Intrigue from Napoleon to
the Holocaust (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 96.
12
Alvarez, p. 92.
13
Alvarez, pp. 106-7 .
11
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preposterous, as was pointed out by the British ambassador to the Holy
See, who, noting the propensity ofltalian military intelligence to collect
information with 'much industry, but less discrimination', scoffed at the
very notion of a secret authority in Switzerland." 14
The Italians were not easily dissuaded on the issue of putative
Vatican power, and continued to rummage through the Holy See 's diplomatic pouches, though technically immune, in search of papal missives. To thwart such methods, the episcopal office in Caire resorted to
the time-tested vector of couriers to send important papers from Switzerland to the Vatican, and when that proved inconvenient, relied on
the couriers of other countries, "who, as a courtesy to the Holy Father,
opened their [own] diplomatic bags for the buff envelopes sealed with
wax impressions of the keys of St Peter." 15
World War I was an event of such great geostrategic importance
to the British empire that it spawned and perpetuated a number of British intelligence agencies, one of which went on to become MI6 or the
British Secret Service. But irrespective of the agency, Switzerland was
the preferred center of anti-Teutonic covert operations. "Early in the
War, [Mansfield Smith] Cumming [head of several military intelligence
units] established an agent network in Switzerland run by Lieutenant
LG Campbell from the French frontier town of Annemasse, near Geneva. [But two other 'agencies' were started.] The first such agency was
created by Colonel George Pollitt, a former chemist with a doctorate
in chemistry from Basie University, who was considered by virtue of
his education to be an ideal insert into the Swiss espionage circus. In
1915, the British vice consul in Zurich, Arthur Abbot, directed Pollitt
and gave him his orders for the initial surveillance of German militaryindustrial preparations .... As well as sending Pollitt to Zurich in 1915 ,
Wallinger also gained Kirke 's approval to 'try and work Geneva'. Wallinger handed over the Genevan 'show' and general control of his Swiss
operations to his elder brother Captain (later Major Sir) John Wallinger
of the Indian Police." 16
British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew also points out
that the British chemical company Bruner Mand was imposed upon
14

Ibid.
Alvarez, p. 108.
16
Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence
Community (London: Heinemann , 1985) , pp . 146-48 .
15
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by British intelligence to provide operatives with front company cover
who could enter various European cities, including Swiss, seeking and
extracting information while using their corporate connections to hide
their espionage work: "In March [1915] [Walter] Kirke [head of a unit
of British military intelligence] persuaded Brunner Mond to send another of their employees, EB Harran, on a mission to Switzerland which
would provide cover for espionage. Harran took over the Romulus/
Schmidt network from Pollitt and by early June was receiving [in Geneva] regular reports from [British operatives] in Mannheim, Nuremburg,
Stuttgart, Bremen and Frankfurt." 17
The British Geneva operation suffered from inconsistent performance and, coupled with idiosyncratic personalities , produced little
effective intelligence. By November, the agent system had been penetrated and "many of Cummings agents in Switzerland were arrested",
effectively ending that part of the intelligence mission. 18
An interesting sidelight to Switzerland's role in world politics after The Great War is that President Woodrow Wilson initially wanted
peace talks to occur in Switzerland: "Prodded by [Wilson's friend and
presidential advisor Edward M] House, Wilson gave the matter a few
moment's thought and opted for Lausanne. But by then Switzerland
looked less and less secure. Lenin's departure [a mere] eighteen months
before had not silenced the Swiss revolutionary workers' movement,
and a wave of protests and police countermeasures disturbed the neutral calm. 'On second thought,' Wilson penned, 'it occurs to me that
Versailles may be the best place for the peace conference, where friendly influences and authorities are in control, rather than in Switzerland
which is saturated with every poisonous element and open to every hostile influence in Europe."' 19
The peace talks, of course, transpired at Versailles and the kernel
of expanded international intrigue was planted and gestated there. In
1917, America had declared war on Germany and entered the European
theater, and a young diplomat named Allen Dulles needed to personally
and professionally relocate from Vienna-as one of the belligerents-

17

Andrew, p. 147 .
Andrew, p. 151.
19
Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994) , p42.
18
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to neutral Bern. There he arranged residential housing at the Bellevue
Palace Hotel. "From the enormous, high-ceilinged lobby to the private
suites with Louis XV furnishings, everything whispered grand luxe
and earthly serenity. To be sure, beneath the surface were tensions and
intrigue; this was where all the 'secret' agents-some of them quite
well known to each other-found it convenient to stay over. 'Enemies
bumped into one another in the elevator, found themselves at the same
desk talking to the concierge, ate in the same dining room' recalled
one of Allen [Dulles'] colleagues. 'Frequently the enemies had been
acquaintances or even friends in past years, now they looked through
each other at meeting and did their best to pretend the other was notexistent' ." 20
It turns out that Allen Dulles, future Director of Central Intelligence, would have quite an experience in Switzerland. The day of
his arrival, Easter Sunday 1917, while sorting through his personal
effects at the US consulate in Bern, a low-level clerk handed him the
telephone as he was the ranking diplomat in the building that day. On
the other end was a young radical Russian, just now departing Bern,
but wishing to speak with an American representative. Dulles had a
tennis game planned with a young Swiss co-ed he'd met in college
and told the caller he should come to the office the next day. Alas, the
caller said, Monday would be too late, and the conversation ended.
Allen Dulles, who would become one the chief anti-Soviet Cold Warriors thirty years later, had as his first official duties in the Swiss city
speaking to Vladimir Lenin, who left on a sealed train back to Russia
to overthrow the czar. 2 1
One of the more obvious aspects of Swiss clandestine work is in
the Swiss banking system. Though not state-sponsored, the degree of
covertness implicit in confidential but not-yet digital banking transactions meant that nondescript couriers, with attache cases loaded with
money or negotiable securities or even with information of a priceless
nature, would transit various of Europe's cities in great anonymity to
conclude confidential business with a variety of clients. So valuable
became this element of Swiss banking that the industry developed a
20
Hugh R Wilson, The Education of a Diplomat (New York: Longman's Green,
I938), pp . 209-10, quoted in Grose, p 28.
21
Grose, p. 26.
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cadre of professional couriers whose expertise at avoiding Customs
inspectors or other governmental attempts at interdiction equaled or
surpassed those of the intelligence services of recognized states. In
fact, as business historian TR Fehrenbach points out, because of Swiss
expertise in unobtrusive operations, "[a]cross Europe the use of nominees [anonymous persons who act for another] and front companies
came into vogue" .22 And until airport security measures made it prohibitive, Swiss banking couriers were known to jet around the Middle
East with as much as 20 kilograms of gold underneath their belts. 23
Economist RT Naylor recounts, and also bibliographically documents,
cases where Geneva's Banque de Credit Internationale moved money
to and from Israel (among other places) and was used in the 1970s as
Mossad's European paymaster. 24
One of the best sources for an encyclopedic survey of Swiss intelligence and covert operations which affected Swiss national policy during Hitlerite Europe is Pierre Braunschweig's Secret Channel to Berlin:
The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence in World
War ll. 25 Roger Masson was the head of Swiss war-time intelligence and
Walter Schellenberg was Hitler's intelligence czar; their contacts and
communications, through the Nazi's thrusts and the Swiss parries, are
very revealing about clandestine operations from the 1930s to beyond
V-E Day. Typical of the kinds of counterintelligence operations Masson
was supervising is a comment made in a 1941 memo to the Chief of the
Swiss General Staff. The memo's comment illustrates the components
of the information net useful to Swiss intelligence: "The contacts with
the various federal and cantonal authorities, which had gained an insight into certain foreign plans and intentions or were able to shed light
on certain incidents, were satisfactory in every respect; we were grateful for their cooperation. The contacts with the Swiss National Bank and
the Department of Economy and its Commerce Section were particular-

22

TR Fehrenbach, The Swiss Banks (New York: McGraw-Hill , 1966), pp . 44-

55 .
23

RT Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare , Embargo Busting
and State-Sponsored Crime (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1999), p. 99.
24
Naylor, p. 100 .
25
Translated by Karl Vonlanthen and Frances Stirnemann-Lewis (Philadelphia:
Casemate, 2004). See also Neville ¾),Lie's Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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ly valuable, and so were the contacts with the Federal Office of Heath,
with which we exchanged some information, and the Federal Office of
Veterinary Science." 26
Not only did government agents see Switzerland as innocuous
cover, but corporate spies also found Swiss centrality useful to uncovering commercial secrets. In one particular example illustrative of the
sorts of escapades frequently undertaken, a staff member at Geneva's
Union des Banques Suisse (UBS), known only as Herr Stroehlin, was
apparently the target of blackmail by French intelligence agencies looking for a way to penetrate the bank for information on American corporate clients. French agents planted a stolen Alfa Romero vehicle in his
home on the French side of the Swiss border and then called the police;
the hapless man was at a loss to explain the presence of the contraband.
Quickly grasping what the French authorities were after, Stroehlin fingered another banker, known as Herr Ralf, who might be able to provide
the desired information. It was agreed that the two bankers would rendezvous with the French agents at the Hotel Sheraton in Zurich and, over
drinks, discuss the remuneration for obtaining what the French covert
operatives wanted. The French refused to receive the purloined information in Switzerland, and the bankers didn't want to leave Switzerland
with it, so the two parties agreed to swap the information for twenty
thousand Swiss francs at the train station in Basel. At the designated
time, Stroehlin and Ralf appeared with a valise and acknowledged the
two French agents loafing on the station platform; meeting, the quartet
sauntered over to a kiosk. "They ordered beers . Suddenly a swarm of
thirty Swiss police officers arrived. The two French agents were clearly
shaken but they soon realized they'd been set up. Herr Ralf, it appeared,
was not a corrupt banker. Indeed, he was none other than Ralf Elsner,
the chief of security at UBS". The French men were arrested, a situation which caused great embarrassment for the French government,
who had sent their agents into Switzerland with no official exculpatory
documents and with only the twenty thousand francs in cash; a few days
later, "the Swiss notified senior French officials of their agents' arrest.
The Swiss kept the funds." 27
26

Braunschweig, p. 51, emphasis added .
Peter Schweizer, Friendly Spies: How American's Allies are Using Economic
Espionage to Steal our Secrets (New York: Atlantic Month Press, 1993), pp . 107-8.
27
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A German industrial spy, Karl Heinrich Stohlze, used the IBM
research lab in Zurich as his corporate espionage target. This lab had
been working to make semiconductors more efficient at warmer temperatures: "For two months, Stohlze stayed in Zurich, where his mission was to observe the workings of the facility, follow and track its
employees, and establish a plan for tapping into the facility's secrets
when orders were given to do so" . Through the use of native Germans
employed at the lab, and through bribing other Swiss workers, Stohlze
obtained proprietary IBM data. 28
The Israelis also used Switzerland for significant industrial espionage. A small unit of the Israeli Defense Ministry, most commonly
known by the acronym of is Hebrew name, LAKAM (Scientific Liaison Bureau) , and which was heavily involved in the only espionage
prosecution of an American convicted of spying for Israel, the Jonathan
Pollard case, had great success in industrial espionage; but as notorious was the Pollard case, its most significant caper was not wrought
on American but on Swiss soil. Despite Israeli success in the 1967
Six-Day War, Israel recognized a great need for an advanced fighter
jet; but they also recognized they couldn't afford to buy new ones
on the open fighter jet market. It was determined that if Israel could
somehow obtain plans or blueprints of someone else's fighter, Israel
could more economically build one at home. Acknowledging its technological deficit, LAKAM agents fanned out across the industrialized
world. As industrial espionage historian Peter Schweizer characterizes
it, "its reach is enormous. LAKAM agents have operated in the United
States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland, and
Sweden. They have stolen secrets worth hundreds of millions, perhaps
billions, of dollars ." 29 In time, a disgruntled Swiss engineer, Alfred
Frauenknecht, who was employed at the factory which built the latest version of the French Mirage jet, met an Israeli defense attache
assigned to Israel's Paris embassy. Though not Jewish, Frauenknecht
had great sympathy for Israel and after several meetings with the attache, Frauenknecht agreed to become a LAKAM agent specifically
charged with getting the Mirage's blueprints. Working with a nephew
who also worked in the Dassault, the Mirage's manufacturer's Swiss
28
29

Ibid , pp. 166-67 .
Ibid, p. 213.
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supply chain, Frauenknecht ultimately delivered several thousand documents to his LAKAM handler. The thoroughness of Frauenknecht's
vacuuming of Swiss documents ultimately led company security officials to become suspicious and Frauenknecht was eventually arrested
and convicted. He only spent a year in prison--and, in fact, was on hand
in Israel for the Kfir fighter jet's inaugural test flight. 30
In the mid-1970s, the post-Vietnam Cold War took a slightly different tilt, pitting the US and other western powers against so-called
"rogue states" instead of against the usual suspects (the Soviet Union
and its proxies), and targeted countries which seemed to choose to ignore the conventions of international society in favor of locally-popular yet morally-dubious policies. Two such targeted states were Libya
and Uganda-Libya, and its leader Muammar Qaddafi, for its defiance
of the UN ,31 and Uganda, for its expulsion of thousands of ethnic south
Asians via forced deportations, ordered by its hyperparanoid leader Idi
Amin. To find out what was going on in these countries, the Central
Intelligence Agency outsourced some of its clandestine intelligence
collection to the Israelis (and to other surrogates); one such operation,
known in the literature by the internal CIA code name KKMOUNTAIN, utilized the Israeli intelligence expertise of the Mossad, who
created an ingenious intelligence operation that relied on Switzerland
for its success.
It seems that Amin was on a state visit to Libya in 1975 when
Qaddafi flew Amin home in his then-state-of-the-art Gulfstream II business jet. Qaddafi had purchased the aircraft from a Zurich-based aviation company, Zimex, whose owner, Hans Zeigler was, unbenownst to
Qaddaffi (or to almost anyone else), a Mossad agent, and had groomed
Zimex in Zurich to be a Mossad front at the disposal of the Israeli government. Zeigler sold Qaddafi the bizjet and provided a short-term "wet
lease", the aviation industry term for also providing flight crew, to man
the plane and to fly it anywhere the Libyan dictator wanted to go. Every time Qaddafi flew the GII, it was crewed by Zimex personnel, all
of whom, it turns out, were also Mossad operatives. In addition to the

30
Ibid, pp. 219-20. The Kfir is a nearly-exact duplicate of the Mirage , and is stil
in service with the Israeli Air Force.
3
' Side-bar: President Ronald Reagan's attack on Qaddafi is depicted in the 1981
Tom Cruise movie "Top Gun" .
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wet lease, Zimex also sold the Libyan dictator a state-of-the-art sound
system to adequately complement the plane's sumptuous interior, complete with top-of-the-line speakers, headphones and an elaborate panel
of controls for the then-popular music cassettes and eight tracks of the
day. Unbeknownst to Qaddafi, when Zimex provided a sound-listening
system, it also covertly embedded among the electronics microphones
and recording devices so that all conversations on the plane-Qaddafi's
and others'--were recorded by the Zimex crew, providing Zimex's Israeli sponsor with a veritable treasure-trove of rare intelligence from an
unsuspecting Arab leader.
The Ugandan dictator Amin was quite taken with the Libyan jet's
performance and opulence and wanted one for himself. Qaddafi put
Amin in touch with Zeigler in Zurich, who contacted an American by
the name of James Wilmot, chairman and co-founder of Page Airways,
who delivered to Amin his own decadent Gulfstream II jet. According
to published reports, Amin and Wilmot became close personal friends,
Wilmot spending time in Kampala as Amin 's presidential guest, which
gave Wilmot the opportunity to sell more aircraft to Amin. Not long after, Amin determined that his air force needed transport planes, which
Page conveniently sold to Amin through Zimex . From its base in Zurich, Zimex also sold Amin a Boeing 707 cargo plane , and the next
year Zeigler induced Amin to lease another plane; all these aircraft
were contractually wet-leased, crewed by Mossad and by Americans
working for a variety of CIA aviation-based front companies, and were
all rigged to collect and record intelligence emanating from Ugandan
sources. Flights from Zurich and other European cities to and from
Uganda exported Ugandan cash crops like coffee and cocoa, while
smuggled arms among consumer goods made the return trips profitable. Aside from the airborne conversations recorded and delivered to
espionage managers, the aircraft were occasionally flown into areas not
usually visited by westerners, due to the clandestine nature of supplying the regional rebel armies and insurrectionist groups Amin supported. Zimex and its Zurich-based operatives made it a watershed Israeli
and American intelligence.32

32
Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the USIsraeli Covert Relationship (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991) , pp . 100-19 .
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Zurich has also been a center for the clandestine transfer of assets.
The western-assisted mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s used European and Swiss locales
as transfer points for commodities that had cash-value in Afghanistan;
initially, opium and heroin were products with enormous covert barter
capabilities, but as the Taliban in Afghanistan increased the territory
under their theocratic control they also engaged in opium suppression
as part of their savage interpretation of Islamic law, and "encouraged"
Afghan farmers to grow other cash crops. Gold, watches, counterfeit
money and other contraband were useful to the Taliban, and trafficking in those commodities were approved substitutes for heroin. Those
smuggling contraband initially relied on secret Turkish routes, but enforcement of anti-smuggling laws in NATO-partner Turkey meant the
Afghan smugglers needed another avenue to markets; thus emerged
the Bulgarian connection. When black marketers in Sofia and other
ports had cash that need to be safely converted into bank accounts ,
the undercover entrepreneurs looked north-west to Switzerland for the
protection of Swiss banking laws. According to Naylor, "In Sofia, the
[smuggler's] money was taken to a special warehouse owned by and
import-export company controlled by Bulgarian intelligence. Bulgarian officials took a modest $1 to $3 per $1000, and the remainder was
turned over to couriers. Escorted to the airport by Bulgarian police, the
couriers winged their way to Zurich airport, either turning the money
over to other couriers sent by the Swiss banks or depositing it directly
in branches of those same backs kept inside the transit area [of the airport]. The Bulgarian nexus also worked in reverse: money in the Swiss
banks was used to buy gold. Armoured [sic] cars conveyed the gold to
Zurich airport. Couriers with ten to twenty kilograms strapped around
their bodies flew to Sofia. The Bulgarian police met and accompanied
them to the safe house. The gold was weighed, the Bulgarians getting
$60 per kilogram, then stuffed under false floors of buses carrying back
to Istanbul their share of the 60 to 100 tons of gold (worth [then] more
than $1 billion) annually smuggled via Bulgaria into Turkey [and back
to the Taliban] ." 33
The Swiss can be maddeningly polite in the midst of a covert
operation. For example, the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal ,
33
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widely known in counterterrorism circles as a bloodthirsty and frequent
attacker of innocent civilians, funded his Baghdad-based, then Damascus-based, organization with huge contributions from wealthy Arabs. In
the early 1980s, a known associate of Abu Nidal's, a rumpled, unkempt
but gregarious associate named Abd Al-Rahman Isa , was sent from
Syria to Geneva to deposit cash in one of Abu Nidal's Swiss bank accounts. The disheveled Isa is reported to have landed at Geneva airport
carrying a suitcase burdened by $5 million in cash; asked by a Swiss
Customs agent if he had anything to declare, Isa calmly replied that he
had $5 million cash in his suitcase, which, the Customs agent quickly
confirmed . As terrorism scholar Patrick Seal recounts, "Respectfully,
the customs officer detailed one of his colleagues to escort Isa to the
bank of his choice" .34
In a pattern used by contemporary Arab terrorists like Al Qaeda,
Abu Nidal depended heavily on the Swiss to enable some of his operations: "Switzerland is important to Abu Nidal because much of his
money is deposited there and he is anxious to protect it. He needs privileges in Switzerland, residence permits, visas, the freedom to move
in and out for himself and key members of his organization. He does
his utmost to conciliate the Swiss authorities, frequently sending his
representatives, Atif Hammuda, of the Finance Directorate [of Nidal's
organization] and Ali al-Farrah, of the Intelligence Directorate, to negotiate with the Swiss. But when he feels the dialogue [sic] is flagging,
he does not hesitate to use forceful measure. In 1988-89, when some
of his international financial dealings were revealed (following the defection to the West of Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-Silwani, manager of his
trading enterprise in East Berlin), he feared that Switzerland might be
persuaded to freeze his accounts there. He immediately sent a message
to Swiss intelligence threatening havoc at the Zurich airport and, in
a characteristic preemptive strike, kidnapped two Swiss delegates of
the International Red Cross at Sidon [Lebanon] in October 1989. When
the crisis passed, the delegates were released." 35 Abu Nidal also had a
Zurich-based trading company which provided revenue and cover for

34
Patrick Seale , Abu Nidal-A Gun For Hire : The Secret Life of the World 's Most
Notorious Arab Terrorist (New York: Random House , 1992) , p. 187.
35
Ibid, pp. 270-71 .
36
Ibid . p. 291. Abu Nida! killed himself in Baghdad.
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many of Abu Nidal 's attacks, the head of which, in 1987, was executed
as a CIA and Mossad spy. 36
In the 1980s, Switzerland was a geographically-central location
for covert operations thousands of miles away. Iranian, Iraqi, Saudi,
Russian, American, and Israeli intelligence agencies (among many
other countries) used Swiss cities and airports as the preferred site for
clandestine acquisitions. Several documented cases reveal how Saddam
Hussein used Swiss centrality are illustrative of the scope and depth of
Swiss-based secret mission.
To contextualize, Iran's 1979 revolution removed the pro-western
Shah and installed a very independent Shia caliphate in Tehran. Sunni
Saddam Hussein, thinking Shia Iran was otherwise distracted, chose to
attack Iran, seeking greater territory from which Iraq could extract more
oil and have additional oil terminals for international shipping. Because
of the opportunity to stick an American finger in the Iranian eye, official US policy was to secretly help Iraq as much as possible. One of
the ways in which the US officially helped Iraq was to covertly acquire
weapons systems.
Between early 1988 and July 1989, the Banca Nationale de! Lavoro (BNL), an Italian merchant bank with a branch in Atlanta-with
official US approval-processed more than 2500 letters of credit in
American and European for unspecified Iraqi customers. In April 1989,
BNL provided five and half million dollars in credit to lubricate the purchase of "300 tons of yarn" by Iraqi purchasers from the Turkish international trading house, Entrade. This and many other loans and letters
of credit went from Atlanta "straight to front companies in Switzerland
that were sending sensitive NATO-based equipment and technologies
to Baghdad for the Condor II mission project, Saddam's high-priority
ballistic missile that was at the top of the State Department's list of dangerous nuclear proliferation risks". The yarn deal was a covert attempt
to obfuscate the arms deals, and no yarn ever arrived in Iraq .37
Only a few years earlier, Saddam had used Swiss companies to
arrange military purchases, helping to covertly use Swiss assets to improve the equipment into sophisticated lethal killing machines. On one

37
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occasion, Iraq had contracted with the German aviation company MBB
(Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm) for helicopters, but as "attack helicopters" were on an international list of prohibited weapons, the Iraqi
regime couldn't get them directly; the deal was covered a paper sale to a
front in Indonesia . Initially disclosed to (then-West) German parliamentarians as "executive helicopters", the shipment left the Munich MBB
factory, "but they didn't go directly to Iraq [or to the advertised destination , Indonesia]. First they made a stopover in Switzerland, where a retrofit firm called Transair Swiss mounted Swiss-built [Oerlikon 20-mm
canons and] rapid-fire guns and other weaponry". The altered aircraft
were then sent into Austria for additional communications equipment,
where an Iraqi military transport plane fetched them - the choppers
never got close to Indonesia.38
On another occasion , Iraq contracted with Belgian and French engineers to build a secret facility at Akashat ostensibly for biomedical
research. As the project matured, the Belgians and French onsite staff
noticed a marked increase in Iraqi security, including uniformed guards,
new scrolls of barbed wire, and the imposition of travel restrictions on
the engineers. In December 1980, the Europeans discovered that the
Swiss firm of Alesa Alusuisse Engineering had begun work on a facility to process uranium. The project took on unnecessary secrecy when
the Belgians and other foreigners attempted to socialize with their new
Swiss neighbors , only to find that "the Swiss workers did not mix with
the others, their project [being] shroud[ed] in [unusual] secrecy". It was
disclosed much later that the western Iraqi projects at Akashat and Al
Qaim were fundamental parts of the Iraqi chemical weapons production
regime. 39 "Al Qain and Akashat had a perfectly legitimate purposeto develop Iraq's enormous phosphates deposits into an industry-but
they also fit a secret plan: to ensure the basic chemicals for Saddam
Hussein's poison gas machine" .40
The passage of time always lubricates the heavy doors of the information prison; clearly, more research needs to be done on the issue of
the use of Swiss territory, assets, and personnel on the global covert and
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clandestine missions issue. However, it will be obvious to scholar and
citizen alike that there is no ignoring the role Switzerland has played
and continues to play in the ongoing drama of the world's covert intrigues .41
- Brian Champion, Brigham Young University

41

Swiss diplomacy was instrumental in brokering peace in the Middle East. See
Douglas M Johnston , Jr. Religion, Terror and Error: US Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011 ), p. 173. Appendix
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